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RECENT CASES
EQUITABLE TITLE; EFFECT OF CONTRACT
TO CONVEY AND/OR VOID DEED
In a recent case,' the Supreme Court was afforded an opportunity to
determine whether either legal or equitable tide to land, standing alone,
would give the title holder a right to homestead exemption. The court
avoided such an adjudication by finding that under the following facts
there was no division of these titles:
A, under a contract to convey land, delivered to B, vendee, on Decem-
ber 26, 1944, a deed blank as to the grantee's name, B having paid the
purchase price. Under the contract, A remained iii possession until Jan-
uary 15 in the position of tenant (at least both parties so regarded A's
occupancy). On January 8, B sold to C, delivering the original deed to
C and inserting C's name therein as grantee. The City of Jacksonville,
in which the land was situated, contended that none of these parties was
entitled to homestead exemption for the year 1945.
The court held that the deed was void and that consequently neither
legal nor equitable title passed to B. The previous decisions of thai
court negative such a conclusion as to equitable title; instead, they indi-
cate that the execution and delivery of the deed was a superfluous trans-
action, in that equitable title passed to the vendee, B, under the contract
to convey.2 The Florida court did not stand alone in its past opinions.3
I Simpson v. Hirshberg, ........ Fla ........., 30 So. 2d 912 (1947).
2 In Felt v. Morse, 80 Fla. 154, 85 So. 656, (1920) the court adopted
as its own a Maryland doctrine that from the time the vendor and
purchaser of land have entered into a binding agreement, the pur-
chaser becomes "in equity the owner."
Compare the language in Schmidt v. Kibbens, 100 Fla. 1684, 132 So.
194, (1931) where the court spoke of the "vendee's equitable estate
in the lands" under the "contract establishing the relation of vendor
and vendee."
In Marion Mortg. Co. v. Grennan, 106 Fla. 913, 143 So. 761, 87 A. L. R.
1942, (1932) the court affirmed its previous decisions, saying: "In
the case of Felt v. Morse, 80 Fla. 154, So. 656, this court said 'that
from the time the owner of land enters into a binding contract for its
sale, he holds the same in trust for the purchaser, and the latter be-
comes a trustee of the purchase money for the vendor.' It is a gen-
eral rule also that the legal title to property agreed to be- conveyed
remains in the vendor as security for the payment of the agreed pur-
chase price, and the vendee is regarded as beneficial owner. Schmidt
v. Kibben, 100 Fla. 1684, 132 So. 194."
Again in Laganke v. Butter, 137 Fla. 71, 187 So. 586, (1939) the
court said that it was immaterial whether or not the grantor had
executed and delivered to the grantee a valid deed, that is, a deed
containing a description of the property to be conveyed; the grantor
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It could not be contended that the court's conclusion was based on a
theory that the elfect of the void deed was to eradicate the consequences
of the agreement of sale and payment thereunder, for that court held
on a previous occasion that where a deed was invalid because of non-
conformity with the formalities as to witnesses, there was a contract to
convey by reason of the invalid deed. 4 The court's statement would seem
to be inconsistent with its previous definitions of equitable title.5
Following a circuitous route to judgment, the court reasoned that
since A held both the legal and the equitable title on January 1, the
land acquired its homestead character on that date and this exemption
passed ultimately to C. However, assuming that the court was moti-
vated by a desire to award homestead exemption, it does not appear that
it was necessary to decide that A held both titles, for the words of the
statute indicate that either legal or equitable title is sufficient to support
the homestead claim. 6
had received the consideration, and the beneficial title had passed to
the grantee.
3 In Golden v. Bilbo, 192 Iowa 319, 184 N. W. 643, (1921) the court
held that a deed lacking the name of the grantee passed equitable
title by delivery. Accord: 1mare v. Shearer, 197 Iowa 506, 197 N. W.
631, 32 A. L. R. 733 (1924); Nebraska Wesleyan University v. Smith,
113 Nebr. 208, 202 N. W. 625 (1925).
4 Seitter v. Riverside Academy, 144 Fla. 69, 197 So. 764 (1940).
5 In George E. Sebring Co. v. O'Rourke, 101 Fla. 885, 134 So. 566,
559, it was said: " 'An equitable title is a right or interest in land,
which, not having the properties of a legal estate, but being merely
a right of which courts of equity will take notice, requires the aid of
such court to make it available.' Pogue v. Simon, 47 Or. 6, 81 P. 566,
567, 114 Am. St. Rep. 903, 8 Ann. Cas. 474 (1905).
" 'Equitable title' has also been defined to be a right, imperfect in
law, but which may be perfected by the aid of a court of chancery
by compelling parties to do that which in good faith they are bound
to do, or removing obstacles interposed in bad faith to the prejudice
of another. See Words and Phrases, Second Series, Vol. 2 page 308,
and authorities there cited."
6 "Every person who has the legal title or beneficial title in equity
to real property in this state and who resides thereon and in good
faith makes the same his or her permanent home, or the permanent
home of another or others legally or naturally dependent upon said
person. shall be entitled to an exemption..." Fla. Const. art. 10, sec.
7, in which the use of the conjunction indicates that either of the two
titles by itself is sufficient to support the homestead right.
As to equitable title, in Beall v, Pickne., i50 F. 2d 467, 16- A.L.R. 1281
(1945), the Federal Court, after a thorough discussion of homestead
laws and the Florida constitutional provisions, in particular, held that
an equitable interest is enough to support the homestead claim as
against creditors of the claimant. While the question of bankruptcy
was there involved, the situation would seem to be analogous to that
in the principal case.
AJIMJAII LIWIP QUA,4RTERLY
The City contended that A had retained only the naked legal title
and was therefore not entitled to homestead exemption, the other parties
being obviously not qualified, It would appear that the court reasoned
as the City did ; that legal title alone would not suffice.
If the court did so decide, then it would appear that the court over-
looked the obvious fact that even though A had held both the legal and
the equitable title on January 1, on that date A was a mere tenant, if
not in fact, at least as far as his intention was concerned. That inten-
tion was clearly in conflict with the Constitutional provisions.7 Assum-
ing that A held both titles, can it be said that he had the requisite "good
faith" ?
Another question arising from the Simpson case is whether or not the
delivery of a deed to the grantee authorizes the completion of blank
spaces as in the Law Merchant and Negotiable Instrument Law. Ac-
cording to some authorities, when the grantor receives the consideration
and delivers the deed fully executed in other respects, unless a contrary
intention appears, authority to a grantee to fill a blank for his name is
implied.8
NATURE OF RIGHT CONFERRED BY OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSE *
The recent reversal upon rehearing in the Paoli Case demonstrates
confusion as to the nature of licenses, prevalent in Florida as elsewhere.
In this case an administrative board arbitrarily revoked the license of a
horse trainer.' Originally, the court took the position that a mere
7 As will be seen, Note 5, supra, the Constitution declares that the
claimant to exemption must "in good faith" make the premises on
which he resides "his or her permanent home". Would that not exclude
A in the principal case?
8 In Fisher v. Paup, 191 Iowa 296, 180 N. W. 167 (1920), the court
determined that where the seller of property executed a deed with the
grantee's name blank, and the buyer exchanged the property with
another by delivering to him the blank deed, authority in such other
to insert his name as grantee in the blank deed was to be implied, and
when that was done, the conveyance, including covenants, related back
to the date of its execution by the grantor.
Other courts have spoken of this implied authority: Handelman v.
Mandel, 70 Colo. 136, 197 P. 1021 (1921) ; Gilbert v. Plowman, 218 Iowa
1345, 256 N. W. 746 (1934); Holliday v. Clark, Mo., 110 S. W. 2d 1110,
1111 (1937).
*State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin et al. Fla...., 31 So. 2d 627 (1947).
i Paoli, a trainer, had been licensed under rules promulgated by the
State Racing Commission requiring that, "The trainer shall be the
absolute insurer of, and responsible for, the conditions of the horse
entered in the race, regardless of the acts of third parties, . . ." Benze-
drine was found to have been administered to Jane Acker, a horse
trained by Paoli. The substance of the evidence was that at the time
of the race a groomsman. only recently employed, was in charge of
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